



**COP29**  
Baku  
Azerbaijan

# Analysis of UNFCCC **COP29** Decisions

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## 1.0 Introduction

The UNFCCC COP forums, graced annually by world leaders, technical experts, activists, and people from all walks of life provide a perfect platform to reflect on the latest scientific developments, share ideas and challenges, and cultivate consensus to defeat the single-most existential threat to the survival of humanity and the health of the planet - climate change.

Aimed at securing high-level convergences, these dawn-to-dusk negotiations that build on across-the-year negotiations and workshop processes, including national and regional consolidation of positions are aimed at shaping a deal that is agreeable to all parties. The divergence and convergence of interests, self-preservation among state parties and power play characterise the negotiations spectrum. Historical responsibilities that are contested and the business interests of different parties impact the direction and the pace of the negotiations

This analysis is premised on the COP29 final Decisions, referencing CCDA XII Outcome statement, Decision AMCEN/SS.X/3 on climate change from the Tenth Special Session of the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment and the PACJA Position that articulates the overall African civil society standpoints. The analysis underscores the significance of COP29 in securing the climate finance goal under the NCQG to take after the USD.100 billion goal that expires in 2025.

Africa's key demands at COP29, as articulated by the AGN, can be summarized as follows:

- a. **Climate Finance:** Africa calls for an ambitious New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance, with a commitment of at least USD 1.3 trillion annually, delivered primarily as grants and reviewed regularly to reflect evolving needs and vulnerabilities. These funds must be accessible and responsive to African countries' specific needs and realities, supporting adaptation, mitigation, and resilience without driving debt or dependency. We denounce crippling loans to African countries as climate finance contributions by developed country parties.
- b. **Loss and Damage:** We demanded an urgent increase in funding to the loss and Damage fund beyond the USD 700 million pledged and speedy disbursements from the fund. This fund must prioritise African communities bearing the brunt of climate disasters and establish Nairobi as the headquarters for the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage, enhancing Africa's access to support.
- c. **Just Transition:** Africa's transition to a sustainable economy must be graceful, fair and people-centred, sector-wide addressing energy poverty, green industrialisation, and sustainable use of natural resources. Developed countries must remove trade barriers and ensure that border adjustment measures that were formulated without Africa's participation do not unfairly penalise African economies.
- d. **Adaptation:** Whereas funding Africa's adaptation is estimated annually to cost USD 387 billion, PACJA calls for COP29 to deliver on needs-based adaptation finance that responds to actual needs on the ground and vulnerabilities of people, societies, and economies. Adaptation financing for Africa must prioritise essential sectors, primarily agriculture, water, health and energy, and be accessible through straightforward mechanisms that support the communities most in need.

- e. **Transparency and Accountability:** We demand clear, honest reporting on climate finance contributions and progress on emissions reductions by Developed Countries Parties. Developed countries must uphold their commitments transparently, while African civil society plays a central role in monitoring these processes to ensure resources reach the frontline communities.
- f. **Mitigation:** Meeting the 1.5°C goal requires decisive emissions cuts. Developed countries must set ambitious targets for phasing out fossil fuels and reflect these targets in their NDCs. Africa has contributed the least to this crisis and cannot be left to bear the cost of others' emissions. To this end, priority actions in carbon markets must be recalibrated to further mitigation outcomes and not climate finance contribution to African countries.
- g. **Recognizing Africa's Special Needs and Circumstances:** Called COP 29 to launch work on the consideration of the special needs and special circumstances of Africa under the Paris Agreement in line with the relevant and previous decisions adopted by the COPs.

These clear demands provided a bold vision for the future built on justice and resilience and were not only reasonable but essential for preventing the worst impacts of climate change.

## 2.0 Background

Framed as climate finance COP by the African Group of Negotiators, UNFCCC COP29 in Baku was a transformative space for securing the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG) in line with the Paris Agreement to lock developed countries in a financial deal provide developing countries with funding to implement climate action. Africa was pursuing the adoption of an ambitious and need-based NCQG to the tune of USD.1.3 trillion annually, providing in form of public grants to support developing countries' transitions to low carbon and climate resilient development through the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).

COP29 took place against the backdrop of the release of the Adaptation Gap Report 2024 which faults progress in adaptation financing as not fast enough to close the enormous gap between needs and flows. *The Adaptation Gap Report 2024: Come hell and High Water* highlights the slow progress in progress in adaptation financing and calls on nations to dramatically increase climate adaptation efforts, starting with a commitment to act on finance.

The report notes that addressing the climate challenge will require scaling up adaptation finance, but also a more strategic investment approach. It emphasises that to meet the scale of the climate change challenge, adaptation financing needs to shift from the historic focus on reactive, incremental and project-based financing to more anticipatory, strategic and transformational adaptation, calling for more action in areas that are harder to finance and more complex to develop. Its release was timely coinciding with a COP, meant to deliver on the NCQG.

Nonetheless, complex global geopolitics continued to impact climate action with the number of right-wing movements securing political power in many developed countries. The enormous resources mobilized to finance wars in various parts of the world is an attestation that there are enough resources to mount an effective global response to climate change and what is lacking is the political will. And as if this is not enough, developed countries have intensified their efforts to propagate

falses solutions such as carbon markets and scaled up their upfront and influence on stakeholders in Africa to recognize and support the role of carbon markets in climate finance contributions.

In the midst of this context, Africa's preparation for eventual engagement in Baku began early in the year with the multi-stakeholder convening to review the outcome of COP28 and developing a strategy for COP29. This was reinforced by the Africa Regional Forum on Sustainable Development and the Africa Climate Talks that emphasised on the need to centre adaptation in the next cycle of Nationally Determined Contributions – NDC 3.0. The 12th Conference on Climate Change and Development in Africa (CCDA-12) laid the foundation for Africa's position for COP29. This position was endorsed in the 10th Special Session of the Africa Ministerial Conference (AMCEN), both processes taking place in September 2024 in Abidjan. These conferences underscored the need for amplifying the core principle of the Paris Agreement – *the Common but differentiated responsibilities based on respective capabilities* in COP29 engagement

Overall, COP29 in Baku remained to a section of stakeholders as a 'stop-gap' process with the major decisions being premised in Belem in Brazil. This perception not only impacts preparations but also on seniority of delegates dispatched to Azerbaijan and consequently the slow push both on process and momentum needed to narrow on issues and zoom closer to decisions.

#### **OUR TOPLINE TAKE ON COP29**

- ▶ Once again geopolitical paralysis characterised the COP negotiations' self-interest, with developed and developing nations dominating the blame game over who should act first and pay more.
- ▶ The gap between climate ambition and action has never been wider as witnessed in COP29 and contributed to growing disillusionment. Grand declarations at COPs increasingly ring hollow, reinforcing skepticism about the efficacy of these global gatherings.
- ▶ The USD. 300 billion (Kshs.300T) commitment falls far short of the USD. 1.3 trillion Africa and other developing countries were pushing for to address the gulf in adaptation needs and climate funding for vulnerable people. With the Needs Determination Report by the Standing Committee on Climate Finance estimating the costed needs in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) of developing country Parties at USD 5.036–6.876 trillion up until 2030, it is apparent that the pledge secured in Baku does not inspire ambition, nor does it demonstrate genuine commitment by rich countries to robustly lead in the global response to climate change.
- ▶ Parties' decision to set a goal, with developed country Parties taking the lead, of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing country Parties for climate action; from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources, makes developed countries not only to escape responsibility but almost near impossible to hold them to account for the climate response commitment. The spirit of the principles of the United Nations Climate Change Convention and the Paris Agreement that calls for the provision of public finance by developed countries to developing countries seems to have lost meaning and developing countries are poised to sink into deeper debt.
- ▶ The spirit of reforming the global financial architecture and the outcome decision of the GST revibrated the plenary halls of COP29 in the opening speeches and, in rounds of negotiations.

Unfortunately, the quality of the NCQG is miles apart in responding to the resounding calls for a reformed global financial architecture let alone solving global economic challenges faced by developing countries - high capital costs, and debt sustainability. The decision went flat on this and opened floodgates for more private sector-mobilized climate finances and sinking African communities and nations deeper into debt crisis.

- ▶ The broad import of the outcome of the Global Stock Take process concluded last year in Dubai underscores the need for pragmatic actions in addressing climate change, poverty and sustainable development as interrelated issues while addressing the debt burden of developing countries and reforming international financial architecture was lost in a majority of the outcome decisions
- ▶ The 'recognizing the voluntary intention of Parties to count all climate-related outflows from and climate-related finance mobilized by multilateral development banks towards the achievement of the goal set forth' is again a bold licence for developed countries to count loans to developing countries as climate finance contribution, and opens the doors wide for double-counting Official Development Assistance (ODA) as part of climate finance.
- ▶ A decision with far-reaching ramifications both on mitigation and actualizing climate finance commitments was adopted to promote carbon markets rebranded as 'high-integrity carbon markets' of the UAE Leaders' Declaration on a Global Climate Finance Framework despite our caution against such a decision.

COP29 exemplifies the complexity of multilateralism and the chronic failure of climate diplomacy. The world edges closer to climate catastrophe, while negotiators continue to trade platitudes for progress.

## 3.0 Our take on decisions pertinent to africa, across thematic areas

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### A. MITIGATION

#### AGN and PACJA position

- ▶ Stronger language and commitment to cutting down on emissions as a MUST, Not an Option, and developed countries demonstrate urgent plans for MUST PHASE OUT fossil fuels through ambitious commitments in NDC 3.0.
- ▶ Call for fast-tracked actions in setting targets, particularly developed countries for transitioning away from fossil fuels and equally anchored in their NDCs

At COP28, parties agreed on transitioning away from fossil fuels, and at COP29 in Baku, PACJA hoped for a progressive dialogue that progressed the Dubai commitment with tangible actions. Phasing out fossil fuels is the single most significant action needed to limit the emissions of greenhouse gases and reverse global warming.

**Our take:**

- ▶ COP 29 delivered a bleak outlook both on mitigation and just transition. It revealed the persistent inability of the international community to rise above entrenched divisions, delivering little more than hollow agreements on critical issues of mitigation and just transition. Despite growing urgency, real progress remains elusive.
- ▶ The fossil fuel transition stalled as the much-needed phase-out of coal and stronger methane regulations failed to gain consensus. Resistance from key players like India and Saudi Arabia ensured no binding commitments. Instead, another round of “consultations” was proposed—essentially kicking the can down the road.
- ▶ Enhanced NDC remained a symbolic exercise. The push for updated and more ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) feels like a political performance. Countries are being asked to set ambitious targets with little clarity on how they will meet them, given the inadequate financial and technical support.
- ▶ In a tokenistic manner decision text focused on opportunities, barriers and actionable solutions for reducing emissions from Cities- buildings and urban systems
- ▶ A major disappointment, and an affront to climate justice, is the failure of COP29 to secure progress in framing targets and developing indicators for tracking the transition away from fossil fuels. It seems either a forgotten or a lost conversation right from Dubai.

**B. PROGRESS IN SECURING THE ADAPTATION AGENDA THROUGH THE GLOBAL GOAL ON ADAPTATION****AGN & PACJA Position:**

1. Call for increased climate finance in NCQG for needs-based adaptation for Africa to seize opportunities for job creation, and green growth in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication. In this regard, key sectors such as health, agriculture, water and other livelihood sub-sectors should receive huge allocation of funding under the sub-goal on GGA under the NCQG
2. Call for the establishment of an ambitious sub-goal for adaptation finance that is focused on the provision of public, grant-based finance, to respond to the needs of developing countries, as expressed in countries’ NDCs, NAPs and other national plans
3. Assert that adaptation finance should flow largely through mechanisms and channels that are open and accessible to all developing countries and able to provide finance directly to them, and where these countries are equitably represented in decision-making bodies and able to set the agenda and direction of the institutions.
4. Developed countries must agree to provide the required means of Implementation to support the formulation and implementation of NAPs
5. Commit to ensuring that adaptation finance is gender responsive and that climate finance channels take into account human rights, rights of Indigenous Peoples, local communities,



migrants, refugees, workers, youth, children, persons with disabilities, and people in vulnerable situations, as well as the right to development and intergenerational equity.

PROGRESS REGISTERED	GAPS AND LOSSES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Expanded language on means of implementation to Enablers of implementation to include finance, technology transfer, capacity-building, and factors such as leadership, institutional arrangements, policies, data and knowledge, skills and education, public participation, and strengthened and inclusive governance</li> <li>▶ Launch of the Baku Adaptation Road Map – a space for continuing discussion on issues on knowledge sharing, timing of UAE framework review, links to GST, transformational adaptation, calls to the IPCC, among other elements</li> <li>▶ Establishes Baku high-level dialogue on adaptation, to be convened by the Presidency, which aims to identify ways of enhancing the implementation of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience</li> <li>▶ Decision on the outcome of the United Arab Emirates–Belém work programme should include, where applicable:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(d) Indicators that capture information pertaining to, inter alia, social inclusion, Indigenous Peoples, participatory processes, human rights, gender equality, migrants, children and young people, and persons with disabilities;</li> <li>(f) Indicators that reflect the unique vulnerabilities of children to climate change impacts across the thematic targets and, potentially, cross-cutting indicators related to education and the health of children and young people;</li> <li>(g) Quantitative and qualitative indicators for enabling factors for the implementation of adaptation action, including means of implementation;</li> </ul> </li> <li>▶ Affirmation that the agenda item on matters relating to the global goal on adaptation is a standing agenda item and will continue to be included in the agendas for the sixty-fourth (June 2026) and subsequent sessions of the subsidiary bodies and the eighth (November 2026) and subsequent sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ A sub-goal on financing adaptation under the NCQG was not secured in Baku</li> <li>▶ Equally the commitment of USD.300 billion does not have an indicative minimum allocation for adaptation action.</li> <li>▶ Adaptation efforts are contextualized as country-driven and voluntary – a framing that has been problematic in securing global climate financing for adaptation action</li> </ul>

**Our take:**

- ▶ Lament the lack of a tangible sub-goal on adaptation and therefore lack of precise allocations in the NCQG towards the implementation of the Global Goal on Adaptation
- ▶ COP29 ended without a commitment to matching adaptation finance to actual needs on the ground and enhanced responsiveness to vulnerabilities of communities.
- ▶ The expanded language on means of implementation is a welcome addition, though the added parameters are largely within the jurisdiction of developing countries. Developed countries need to be reminded of the primacy of climate finance in the expanded means of implementation matrix.

**C. CLIMATE FINANCE****AGN & PACJA position:**

1. As a crucial means of implementation of climate ambition, developed countries to scale up access to climate finance for adaptation, delivered to African countries through grants and must be new and additional to Official Development Assistance (ODA), based on their needs and special circumstances
2. Call for an NCQG with a quantum of not less than USD 1.3 trillion annually, to be regularly reviewed to reflect the evolving needs of developing countries, delivered mainly through public grants
3. NCQG must respond to the global economic challenges faced by developing countries - high capital costs, and debt sustainability and emphasize the commitment of developed countries to their obligations on the provision of finance in accordance with the UN Convention on Climate Change and its Paris Agreement;
4. The NCQG must reflect the scale and urgency for responding to climate change and provide sufficient resources to implement adaptation, mitigation, loss and damage and just transition interventions
5. Climate finance, to be secured under the NCQG should contribute to Climate Justice NOT Growing Debt portfolio for Africa. For clarity, PACJA asserts that loans by developed countries parties to African countries do not constitute climate finance contribution by developed countries



PROGRESS MADE	GAPS AND LOSES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Parties decided to set a goal, with developed country Parties taking the lead, of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing country Parties for climate action; from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources</li> <li>▶ Acknowledges challenges faced by developing countries – the increasing costs for adaptation, constrained fiscal space and the critical need for public and grant-based resources and highly concessional finance, particularly for adaptation and responding to loss and damage</li> <li>▶ Decision recognizes the need for scaling up adaptation finance taking into account the GGA targets.</li> <li>▶ Scaling up and prioritize direct access, in support of locally led approaches and institutions, in particular for adaptation measures.</li> <li>▶ Entrenches periodic stocktake on progress made as part of the global stocktake, and a review of this decision and the way forward in 2030.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ The USD. 300 billion (Kshs.300T) commitment falls far short of the USD. 1.3Trillion Africa and other developing countries were pushing for to address the gulf in adaptation needs and climate funding for vulnerable people.</li> <li>▶ The USD.300 billion is to be mobilized from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources, making rich countries escape their responsibility and also almost difficult to hold any Party to account.</li> <li>▶ The framing of the sources makes it absolutely impossible to hold any party to account, potentially a death knell to the Paris Agreement</li> <li>▶ The ‘Recognizing the voluntary intention of Parties to count all climate-related outflows from and climate-related finance mobilized by multilateral development banks towards achievement of the goal set forth’ is again a bold licence for developed countries to count loans to developing countries as their climate finance contribution, and opens the doors wide for double-counting Official Development Assistance (ODA) as part of climate finance.</li> <li>▶ The decision went flat on the insistence on grant-based, public provision of climate finance, opening floodgates for more private sector-mobilized climate finances and sinking African communities and nations deeper into the debt crisis.</li> <li>▶ The decision motivates highly polluting countries and corporates to continue with their development pathways as Africa and other developing countries outcompete each other for the real or imagined “windfall” coming carbon markets. Through the “high-integrity carbon markets”, there is a direct invitation to embrace polluters and be kind in celebrating the uncertain, conditional carbon credits whose value chains are least understood by African nations, apportioning power in developed countries.</li> <li>▶ The envisaged subgoals on adaptation and loss and damage were never secured, nor was a strong text linking the NCQG and the GGA / UAE targets</li> <li>▶ An attempt to balkanize and fragment developing countries into LDCs, SIDs and others to weaken their bargaining power</li> </ul>

**Our take:**

- ▶ We emphasise that the USD. 300 billion (Kshs.300T) commitment falls far short of the USD. 1.3 Trillion Africa and other developing countries were pushing for to address the gulf in adaptation needs and climate funding for vulnerable people
- ▶ In a context where private sector funding informs of loans will contribute to the NCQG, key challenges related to implementing actions that respond to actual adaptation needs in Africa enabling countries to create jobs, and advance their green growth agenda in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication.
- ▶ The commitment to a goal to be mobilized from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources provides an avenue for developed country's parties to escape their responsibility while making it almost impossible to hold any Party to account, thus helping them fulfil their long-fought battle to transfer the burden of action to the victims of their actions.
- ▶ The premising of the carbon markets, whose primary role is mitigation within the NCQG not only incentivizes emissions but provides a false glimpse of hope as these markets have failed to deliver on their emission reduction ambitions as well as climate finance
- ▶ Financial pledges to funds in climate response realms – adaptation and loss and damage that are relevant to Africa context remained depressed.

**D. LOSS AND DAMAGE****AGN/ PACJA Position on Loss and Damage matters:**

- ▶ Reiterate our rejection of the proposal for a voluntary contribution to the Loss and Damage fund as advanced by developed countries. Insist on raising vital new and additional finance in the form of grants, not loans, to address loss and damage, and strengthening legislation to embed the polluter pays principle into law whilst also propelling emission cuts;
- ▶ Call for the full operationalization of the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage with sufficient resources, beyond the USD.700million and the SNLD to respond to the needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effect of climate change
- ▶ A sub-goal on Loss and Damage finance in the NCQG to address its specific challenges while guarding against diluting the adaptation sub-goal
- ▶ Call for the reversal of the recent decision to host the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage in Geneva rather than Nairobi by the Advisory Board during its inaugural meeting

**Our take:**

- ▶ Pledges to the loss and damage fund remained pathetically low and uninspiring
- ▶ Our bold call for the decision to host the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage in Geneva to be rescinded remained unheard, as a clear indication of the contempt to sound decisions that accelerate climate action at the frontline

- ▶ Contribution to the fund has remained voluntary in the absence of a subgoal under NCQG anchoring financing for loss and damage

## E. CARBON MARKETS

### PACJA's Position

- ▶ We denounced carbon markets as greenwashing and false narratives as they are not solving the underlying problem of emissions by developed countries' parties.
- ▶ PACJA called for the renegotiation of article 6.4 on carbon markets to better align this with the urgent call for limiting emissions in line with the Paris Agreement. The core business of carbon markets is in scale-up mitigation
- ▶ Be it that carbon markets are to be embraced, the focus of the investments should be on technology-based carbon markets that are not a threat to sustainable land and natural resource governance and human rights of African communities (Areas with less risks on our natural resource base)

### Our take:

- ▶ COP failed to deliver on expected accountability on carbon markets, rather adopted 'high integrity carbon markets' as a loft term that undermines mitigation outcomes
- ▶ It seems through these "high integrity carbon markets", there is a direct invitation to embrace polluters and be kind in celebrating the uncertain, conditional carbon credits whose value chains are least understood by African nations, apportioning power in developed countries.
- ▶ Carbon markets have now been moved to the centre of climate finance contributions as opposed to being mitigation mechanisms as was vividly captured by the COP29 President Mukhtar Babayev's Closing Plenary statement "We finally established the framework of high-integrity carbon markets with Article 6. We are ready to start approving projects. These markets will unlock trillions and save us billions".
- ▶ We insist the adoption of a decision on high integrity carbon credits was not the best outcome decision noting analysis that shows that readiness programmes in countries for the last 15 years are yet to deliver tangible results.

## F. RESPONSE MEASURES

### PACJA Position

- ▶ GST outcomes underscored the importance of addressing the sustainable development challenges in African countries in a just, orderly and equitable manner with the importance of enhanced international cooperation and the international enabling environment being emphasized.

- ▶ Parties should work together to foster a supportive and open international economic system that promotes sustainable economic growth and development for all, especially those in developing countries. All stakeholders, particularly vulnerable communities, should be represented in discussions on response measures.
- ▶ The evolving climate and environment-based unilateral trade measures, including CBAM, and incoming UK and US carbon border taxes among others; and stress that the GST outcomes confirmed that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, are poised to arbitrary and unjustifiably discriminate Africa from trading with its traditional trade allies.

PROGRESS MADE	GAPS AND LOSSES
<p>Agreement to establish a four-year work plan of the forum on the impacts of implementation of response measures and its Katowice Committee on Impacts for 2026 – 2030. The workplan further provides for the following critical items</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Broadened assessment of impacts of response measures to include socio-economic on climate, environment, biodiversity, health, energy poverty and energy mitigation and adaptation policies be implemented towards the achievement of all GST outcomes.</li> <li>▶ Development of KCI toolbox to enable parties to undertake their own assessment for addressing the impacts of response measures, build capacity and share experiences</li> <li>▶ Provision to undertake an assessment of unilateral measures including cross-border carbon adjustment mechanisms (CBAM), fees and any other climate-induced levies relating to trading and climate change impact on developing countries' economies.</li> </ul>	<p>The work plan failed to incorporate the assessment of developing countries' mitigation actions on intergenerational equity, gender considerations, and the needs of Indigenous people and local communities, youth children and persons living with disabilities who form a significant proportion of the communities at the frontline of the climate crisis.</p> <p>SIDS and LDC were not distinctly recognised with respect to their special circumstances in the RM text.</p>

**G. JUST TRANSITION:**

**AGN & PACJA Position:**

1. The focus of just transition must be sufficiently comprehensive to include:- just and equitable mitigation, just adaptation and resilience, financing for the Just transitions, and just trade including increasing access to finance and technology. This is the context of equity and CBDR&RC
2. Just transition work programme should reflect the priorities of Africa, in particular green industrialization, sustainable use and value addition of natural resources, addressing energy poverty and clean cooking needs, in the context of sustainable development and efforts towards poverty eradication.

3. The just transition work programme should promote equity and fairness in the policy space for sustainable development by developing countries, cognizant of the need for a just transition to low-carbon and climate-resilient economies in line with different development needs, and social, economic and environmental implications.
4. Africa calls for the adoption of an ambitious decision under the work programme on just transition pathways that operationalise equity in the pathways for mitigation, adaptation and finance under the Paris Agreement and is cognizant of the continent's unique needs and circumstances. This should ensure a fair and equitable shift to a low-carbon and climate-resilient development.

COP29 Outcome: Despite resuming negotiations on the UAE Just Transition Work Program (JTWP) by parties and several iterations of the texts being published in the second week of COP29, consensus on JTWP was not realized ultimately, parties could not adopt a decision hence preventing the adoption of an actionable work plan for JTWP.

#### **Our take:**

- ▶ The failure to finalize the JTWP represents a significant setback for the just transition movement, which seeks to ensure that climate policies are inclusive and equitable, particularly for workers in vulnerable sectors. The lack of a clear framework leaves many communities and workers unprotected as economies transition towards greener models, exacerbating existing inequalities and undermining the promise of a just transition.
- ▶ The inability to adopt the JTWP decision, reflects broader issues within COP29, where commitments to phase out fossil fuels and accelerate renewable energy initiatives were similarly stalled. This delay poses risks not only to achieving climate targets but also to managing transitions fairly and equitably.
- ▶ Developed countries continued to pay lip service to demands on equity. Just transition financing remains an empty buzzword. Vulnerable nations are left with ambitious targets but insufficient means to achieve them, ensuring their dependence on polluting energy sources like coal and gas

### **THE SPECIAL NEEDS AND CIRCUMSTANCES FOR AFRICA**

The call on COP29 to launch work on the consideration of the special needs and special circumstances of Africa under the Paris Agreement in line with the relevant and previous decisions adopted by the COPs did not proceed to the agenda stage.



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**PANAFRICAN CLIMATE JUSTICE ALLIANCE  
(PACJA)**

Continental Secretariat,  
Kabarnet Road, Off Ngong Road J13  
P. O. Box 51005 00200,  
Nairobi, Kenya

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